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COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGISLATION
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF STATE RESTRICTIVE LABOR
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 1947
S TRIFE of an intensified nature in the form of strikes and labor
disputes has, since the termination of World War II, dis-
turbed the American industrial scene and has focused public at-
tention upon the subject of labor relations. Heated discussions
and debates have been staged on the national forum, and a variety
of views have been expressed in law review articles1 on the labor
problem. With the public mind aroused and demanding action,
great activity in the national capitol and in the state legislatures
has ensued.2 The new Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,'
popularly known as the Taft-Hartley law, which amended the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935, is the product of congres-
sional action. Some thirty-one states have enacted laws pertaining
to labor relations, the great majority of which are restrictive in
nature. The statutes enacted by the states are as important as
federal legislation because most suits involving labor controversies
are instituted in the state courts. Labor and management are thus
called upon to conduct their activities within a pattern prescribed
by both state and federal regulation. Upon the wisdom of these
rules and their intelligent administration will depend, in a large
part, industrial harmony.
I See Comment, 44 MICH. L. REv. 1089 (1946) ; Summers, The Right to loin a Union,
47 COL. L REV. 33 (1947); Note, 56 YALE L. J. 731 (1947) ; Editorial Note, 15 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 327 (1947); 14 UNIV. CHt. L. REv. 332-454 (1947); Symposium, Labor
Dispute Settlement, 12 LAw & CONT M. PRos., 209.389 (1947); Morgan, Improvement
of the Process of Collective Bargaining, 12 Mo. L REv. 10 (1947) ; Smith & LeLancey,
The State Legislatures and Unionism, 38 Mict. L REv. 987 (1940) ; Comment, 42 ILI.
L. REv. 444 (1947) ; and Larson, May Peaceful Picketing Be Enjoined?, 22 TEx L Rev.
392 (1944).
2 Recognizing the importance of keeping abreast of current labor legislation, the
American Bar Association organized a new section on labor relations law in 1946 (See
33 A. B. A. J. 116). The first work of that section recently appeared in the form of a
compilation of state labor legislation enacted in 1947. The State Bar of Texas has created
a similar section. (See 10 TEx. BAR JOUR. No. 10, 1947).
3 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 141-197 (Supp. 1947).
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The state legislation of 1947 manifests an intent to achieve
industrial peace by placing curbs on union activities and purposes.
Some of these laws were enacted before the Taft.Hartley Law and
others subsequent thereto. Many of the laws are more drastic in
their effect than the Taft-Hartley Law. Up to the present date there
has been little interpretation of these new laws by the courts.
Whether they will be a remedy for labor ills remains to be seen.
Generally, the new state statutes are drawn to accomplish vary-
ing objectives: they invalidate or restrict union security contracts;
they prohibit or restrict certain types of strikes and picketing; and
they regulate unions directly by requiring the filing of financial
statements and other data. Miscellaneous statutes have been en-
acted, including legislation making collective bargaining agree-
ments enforceable against either the employer or the labor organ-
ization. A collection and comparison of these statutes should be of
value to indicate possible approaches to certain critical labor
problems.
UNION SECURITY CONTRACTS
The term "union security contract" embraces both "closed
shop" and "union shop" contracts. The "closed shop" requires
membership in a union as a condition of hiring and continued
employment. The "union shop" does not make union membership
a condition of hiring but makes it a condition of continued em-
ployment upon the expiration of a certain length of time after
hiring.! Labor unions consider union security contracts essential
because they make the position of a union secure and strengthen
the organization in its contest for better wages, working conditions
and hours. Management, on the other hand, resists these contracts
for reasons centering around fear of monopoly of the supply of
labor and excessive economic power vested in unions.
The recent legislative trend favors the position of management,
4 GRECORY, LABOR AND THE LAW, 115 (1946).
5 See Hammond, The Closed Shop Issue in World War 1!, 21 N. C. L REv. 127, 129,
130 (1943).
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for fourteen states have passed laws or constitutional amendments
which prohibit or restrict union security contracts. In this group
are Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Nebreska, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.! Four of these states' had
enacted statutes previously to deal with this subject, and the 1947
laws are "enforcement statutes" to carry into effect the provisions
of the earlier acts.' The enforcement statute of Arizona prohibits
the making of union security contracts by declaring them illegal
and void,' whereas the statutes in Arkansas, Nebraska and South
Dakota declare the entry into such a contract to be a misde-
meanor.10
Amendments to an already existing statute in New Hampshire
and to the Arizona enforcement statute also contain a provision
that a person injured by the acts declared illegal is entitled to
injunctive relief. The other three states enacting enforcement
statutes do not expressly grant such a remedy.
In general, the statutes of the fourteen states provide that no
person shall be denied employment because of membership in or
refusal to join a labor organization. Maine is possessed of a dis-
tinctive statute in that express wording provides for non-applica-
bility to the making or maintaining of union shop contracts.1" With
the exception of the Maine statute, a literal reading of the remain-
6 ARIZ. CoNsr. AmsNo. adopted Nov. 5, 1946 and Ariz. Laws, 1947, c. 81 (this law is
inoperative until approved by the electors; it is to be submitted to vote on Nov. 2, 1948) ;
ARK. CONST. AmEND. No. 34, adopted Dec. 7, 1944 and Ark. Laws, 1947, c. 101; Ga. Laws,
1947, Act No. 140; Iowa Laws, 1947, S. B. 109; ME. Ray. STAT., c. 25, § 41-A (1944), as
amended by Me. Laws, 1947, c. 395; NEB. CO NST. AME.ND. adopted Nov. 5, 1946 and Neb.
Laws, 1947, L. B. 347; N. H. REv. LAws, c. 212 § 21 (1942), as amended by N. H. Laws,
1947, c. 194; N. M. CONST. Amr-ND. adopted Feb. 24, 1947; N. C. Laws, 1947, H. B. 229;
N. D. Laws, 1947, H. B. 151 (this law is inoperative until approved by the electors; it is
to be submitted to vote on June 29, 1948) ; S. D. CONIST. AMENo., Art. VI, § 2, adopted
Nov. 5, 1946 and S. D. Laws, 1947, S. B. 224; Tenn. Laws, 1947, S. B. 367; Tex. Laws,
1947, c. 74; and Va. Laws, 1947, c. 2.
- Arizona, Arkansas, Nebraska and South Dakota.
s See, e.g., Neb. Laws, 1947, L B. 347.
9 Ariz. Laws, 1947, c. 81.
"0 Ark. Laws, 1947, c. 101, § 4; Neb. Laws, 1947, L B. 344, § 3; and S. D. Laws, 1947,
S. B. 224, § 5.
" M. REv. STAT., c. 25 § 41-A, as amended by Me. Laws, 1947, c. 395.
194-8]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
ing statutes seems to preclude both the union shop and the closed
shop contract. To condition employment in any form, whether be-
fore or subsequent to hiring, would therefore be a violation of
the laws.
Another provision contained generally in the new laws forbids
the making of contracts excluding persons from employment be-
cause of membership or non-membership in a labor organization.
However, the provisions vary in their effect upon a security con-
tract entered into between an employer and an employee or an
employer and a labor organization. Each of the states12 enacting
new laws pertaining to security contracts have provisions which
make such contracts void and unenforceable. The statutes in
Georgia, Iowa, Maine and Tennessee declare that violations are
misdemeanors," and in Georgia and Iowa injunctive relief may
be obtained to prevent a person, firm or organization from doing
any of the acts prohibited." In North Carolina and Virginia union
security contracts have been declared to be contracts in restraint
of trade and commerce, and an employee may recover the dam-
ages he has sustained because of deprivation of employment."
New Hampshire is exceptional in that it permits a contract
which exludes persons from employment by reason of member-
ship or non-membership in a labor organization if it is approved
by a vote of two-thirds of the employees." The two-thirds vote
1 2 Georgia, Iowa, Maine, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas and Virginia.
1s Ga. Laws, 1947, Act No. 140, § 9; Iowa Laws, 1947, S. B. 109, § 6; MF. Rsw. STAT.,
c. 25, § 41-A, as amended by Me. Laws, 1947, c. 395; and Tenn. Laws, 1947, S. B. 367, § S.
14 Ga. Laws, 1947, Act. No. 140, § 8 and Iowa Laws, 1947, S. B. 109, § 7.
15 N. C. Laws, 1947, H. B. 229, §2 and Va. Laws, 1947, c. 2, § 2.
1s N. H. REv. LAws, 1942, c. 212, § 21 (a), 21 (b), 21 (c), and 21 (d), as amended
by N. H. Laws, 1947, c. 194. Other conditions that must be satisfied are: (1) secret bal-
lot (2) where renewal is sought the union shall satisfy the labor commissioner that their
fees are not unduly burdensome (3) there shall be no discrimination provisions in the
contract (4) the contract shall have a clause stipulating for no expulsion without just
cause (5) a union that becomes a party to such a contract must file annually a financial
statement showing the location of their office, the address and salary of each officer, dues
and fees charged, annual receipts from all fees, total money paid as salaries to officers,
and other expenditures including contributions or gifts over one hundred dollars with
name of each recipient.
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must constitute at least a majority of the employees to be cov-
ered by the contract.
Related to the provisions against union security contracts are
those which forbid the requirement of the payment of dues to
a labor organization as a condition of employment. Eight of the
fourteen states dealing with union security contracts have pro-
hibited such a requirement." Five of the states" also forbid an
employer to make a contract providing for the retention of any
part of the compensation of an employee for the purpose of pay.
ing dues or any money to a labor organization without the written
consent of the employee. Thus, what has been termed "compul-
sory check-off" agreements are prohibited. Moreover, where
written consent is obtained, it is usually revocable at the will of
the employee.
The effect of the new laws on existing contracts has been pro-
vided for in Arkansas, North Carolina, Virginia and Texas.1
These states have declared that existing contracts are unaffected
but that renewals and new contracts are subject to the new legis-
lation. Provisions of this nature preserve existent contractual
rights and avoid ambiguity in the application of the legislation.
The statutes of Arizona, Arkansas, Nebraska and Tennessee
concerning union security contracts have already been interpreted
by the courts or by the Attorney General. Without exception they
have been upheld as valid and constitutional. "°
STRIKES AND PICKETING
Labor organizations have relied heavily on the use of strike,
and the picket line to enforce their objectives. These activities
17 Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Tennessee
and Virginia.
18 Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa and Texas.
19 Ark. Laws, 1947, c. 101, § 5; N. C. Laws, 1947, H. B. 229, § 7; Va. Laws, 1947, c. 2,
§ 7; and Tex. Laws, 1947, S. B. 367, § 4.
20 See A. F. of L. v. American Sash & Door Co., 189 P. (2d) 912 (Ariz. 1948) ; Lin-
coln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 3 C. C. H. LAB. LAW
Ssnv. 1 63,919 (1947) ; Mascari v. Intl. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 3 C. C. H. LAB. LAW
SEmv. I1 64,349 (1948); Federal Fire Fighters of Oak Ridge v. Roane-Anderson Co.,
1948]
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are very effective, and it is significant that regulations concern-
ing strikes and picketing are the principal type of legislation
enacted in 1947. Twenty-two states2' have put into effect statutes
which prohibit or restrict one or more of the following activities:
strikes and primary picketing, strikes against public utilities,
mass picketing, libelous picketing, jurisdictional strikes, picket-
ing of homes, secondary boycotts, and secondary picketing.
Primary Strikes and Picketing
Unless authorized by a majority vote of the employees in the
bargaining unit, strikes are forbidden in Delaware, Michigan,
Missouri, North Dakota and Oregon.22 These statutes provide that
the vote shall be taken by secret ballot at an election called by
the labor organization. " In Michigan a ten-day notice of a strike
or lockout must be given to the State Labor Mediation Board.2'
The Mediation Board then attempts a settlement of the dispute,
and if the parties cannot agree, the Board conducts a strike elec-
tion. During this procedure both the employees and the employer
are to maintain the status quo.
The right to picket has been severely restricted by a recent
Pennyslvania statute which limits the right to the employees of
the business being picketed. -5 Picketing by others is an unfair
labor practice under the state labor relations act and is subject to
administrative procedures and court process.
206 S. W. (2d) 369 (Tenn. 1947). (Appeal to the State Supreme Court dismissed.)
ARK. Op. Arr'Y GEN., Aug. 28, 1947; NE. Op. ATT'Y G.N., May 10, 1947.
21 California, Connecticut, Delaware. Florida, Georgia. Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Minnesota. Missouri. Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia and Wisconsin.
22 Del. Laws, 1947, H. B. 212, § 5; Micit. LAWS, 1940 Supp., Pub. Act No. 176, § 9a,
as amended by Mich. Laws, 1947, Pub. Act No. 318; Mo. Laws, 1947, S. B. 79, § 3;
N. D. Laws, 1947, H. B. 160, § 11 (this law is inoperative until approved by the electors;
it is to be submitted to vote on June 29, 1948) ; and Ore. Laws, 1947, c. 355.
23 E.g., see Mo. Laws, 1947, S. B. 79, § 3.
24 Mtct. LAWS, 1940 Supp., Pub. Act No. 176, § 9, as amended by Mich. Laws, 1947,
Pub. Act No. 318.
25 Penn. Laws, 1947, Act No. 294, P. L. 1198, as amended by Penn. Laws, 1947, Act
No. 484, § 6 (2) (d). But see Legis., 21 TEM. L. Quxa. 168 (1947). The author of this
article is of the opinion that the statute is unconstitutional on the basis of recent United
States Supreme Court decisions.
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Three states have forbidden strikes by public employees, and
participants in such a strike lose all employment rights.26 New
York alleviates this strict penalty by permitting reemployment
under certain conditions; the striking public employee who is
reemployed receives no higher salary than he received imme-
diately prior to the strike, his compensation cannot be increased
until three years after his reappointment, and he is placed on a
five-year probation.
In Delaware employees engaging in slow-down or sit-down
strikes are guilty of unfair labor practices under the State Labor
Relations Act.28 These activities are declared to be misdemeanors.
and violators are subject to fines and imprisonment. The declara-
tion prohibiting sit-down strikes is not an innovation, for they
have been considered unlawful seizures of property since their
initial occurrence in 1936 and 1937.
Four states have prohibited the coercion of or interference
with an employee in the enjoyment of his legal rights." These
legal rights include the right to engage in the peaceable pursuit
of one's chosen occupation.
Strikes Against Public Utilities
Strike against public utilities have been declared unlawful in
Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Virginia, provision being made
for compulsory arbitration." Recent legislation in Wisconsin of
this type has been declared unconstitutional by a trial court of
the state." The court held that compulsory arbitration and pro-
26 New York, Pennsylvania and Texas.
27 N. Y. Laws, 1947, c. 391.
28 Del. Laws, 1947, H. B. 212, § 2 (i).
29 Georgia, Michigan, South Dakota and Utah.
s0 Fla. Laws, 1947, c. 23911, § 1-19: Ind. Laws, 1947, c. 341, § 1-18; Mass. Laws, 1947,
c. 596; Mich. Laws, 1947, Pub. Act No. 318; Mo. Laws, 1947, H. B. 180, § 1.22; Neb.
Laws, 1947, L B. 534; N. J. Cum. Sup. REV. STAT. (1937) c. 13 B, tit. 34; Pa. Acts,
1947, Act No. 485; and Va. Laws, 1947, H. B. 6.x, § 1-18 (see also Note, Virginia's
Approach to Strikes Against the Public Interest, 33 VA. L. RE-v. 100 (1947).
31 See State of Wisconsin, ex rel, Dairyland Power Cooperative v. Werb, 3 C. C. H.
LB. LAw SEay. 1 64,385 (1948).
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hibition of strikes resulted in involuntary servitude, deprived
utility employees of liberty without due process, and was a denial
of equal protection of the laws. The court recognized that the
decision might be condemned by public opinion. Manifestly, a
different result might be reached on a weighing of public and
individual interests by another court.
In the states providing for a mandatory resort to arbitration,
a public utility is usually defined as an organization furnishing
water, gas, heat, light and power, as well as transportation and
communication services. It is to be noted that in Indiana, Mich-
igan and Nebraska the definition specifically includes any organ-
ization engaged in furnishing telephone service. These three states
apparently are attempting to preclude the extended strikes and dis-
ruption of telephone service which occurred early last year.
The arbitration procedures in the ten states are similar. The
legislative policy is directed at effective settlement of all labor
disputes between utility employers and employees before serious
harm results to the community served. The parties to the labor
dispute must attempt to settle their differences, and if their efforts
result in an impasse, the governor may appoint either an arbi-
trator or a board of arbitration, if in his opinion the interruption
of service will cause hardship to a substantial number of people.
The board or arbitrator then renders a decision which is final
unless appealed and set aside by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion. In case of violation of the decision or order of the arbitra-
tion officials, penalties of fine and imprisonment may be imposed.
In Massachusetts, Missouri and New Jersey'2 the governor is
empowered to seize a public utility and operate it in the name
of the state, if he is convinced that an interruption of service
catused or threatened by strike or lockout will result in severe
hardship on a substantial number of people. After seizure, work
stoppages and strikes are prohibited. However, individual em-
s-' Mass. Laws, 1947, c. 596, § 4 (b) (1); Mo. Laws, 1947, H. B. 180, § 1-22 and
N. J. REv. STAT. Supp., c. 38 as ameuded by N. J. Laws, 1947, c. 47 and 75, 1 34:13B-13.
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ployees may terminate their employment. A statute in Virginia
also authorizes the governor to seize a utility wherein a labor
dispute exists, and thereafter strikes are illegal. This act does
not provide for arbitration and merely attempts to preserve the
status quo." Apparently the parties are expected to resolve their
dispute by collective bargaining while the seizure is in effect.
The Nebraska statute is less particular than the other statutes
in setting forth prerequisites for calling into play the arbitration
machinery. Nothing is said about findings of hardship on the
public and attempts at conciliation. Instead, the attorney general
may, on his own initiative or by order of the governor, petition
an established court of industrial relations for findings and an
order concerning the dispute.
Texas has a unique statute declaring that picketing of any
public utility with intent to disrupt its services may be enjoined."4
Also, it is a felony to tamper with property of the utility or im-
pair its usefulness with intent to disrupt services."5 Another sec-
tion of the act states that an agreement having for its purpose the
damaging or sabotaging of a utility is a felony, and the offense
is complete even though no overt act has been committed.
Mass Picketing and Libelous Picketing
Mass picketing and picketing tending to obstruct or interfere
with ingress to or egress from a place of employment or use of
roads, highways, railways or airports have been declared unlaw-
ful by six states." The penalty for these activities is fine and im-
prisonment. South Dakota defines mass picketing as picketing by
more than five per-cent of the first one hundred striking em-
ployees," while Texas defines it to occur where more than two
pickets station themselves at any time within fifty feet of an
33 Va. Laws, 1947, c. 9, § 1-18.
34 Tex. Laws, 1947, c. 84, §§ 3 and 4.
35 Tex. Laws, 1947, c. 84, § 5. Michigan also has a similar statute. Micro Laws, 1941,
Pub. Acts No. 190, § 383a, as amended by Mich. Laws, 1947, Pub. Acts No. 61.36 Delaware, Georgia, South Dakota, Texas, Utah and Michigan.
37 S. D. Laws, 1947, S. B. 226, §§ 1-6.
194-8]
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entrance to the picketed premises or within fifty feet of another
picket."
Mississippi, when recently gripped by a widespread bus strike,
called a special session of the legislature and passed a law mak-
ing it a felony to impede the operation of a vehicle used in trans-
portation." Acts of violence andt destruction in connection with
picketing resulted in the enactment of this statute.
40
The Texas statute declaring libelous picketing unlawful is the
only one of its kind enacted in 1947.' Picketing accompanied
by any form of libel or slander is forbidden and subjects vio-
lators to fine and imprisonment. The act attempts to restrict strike
advertisements to truthful statements and would seem to be con-
sistent with United States Supreme Court doctrine."2
Jurisdictional Strikes
Jurisdictional strikes occur where there is a dispute concern-
ing representation of employees in any collective bargaining unit.
Such strikes are to be resolved through an election to determine
the majority representative of the employees in Michigan, Mis-
souri and Massachusetts."3 A provision for issuance of injunction
is included in the Massachusetts statute where the jurisdictional
dispute has been submitted to voluntary arbitration and one of
the parties refuses to abide by the award."
In California a statute makes jurisdictional disputes enjoin-
s8 Tex. Laws, 1947, c. 138.
39 Miss. Laws, 1947, S. B. 2xx.
40 Also enacted at the special session was a law prohibiting the use of explosives to
obstruct transportation facilities and the shooting of firearms or the hurling of missiles
at trains, buses or other transportation facilities, and a law permitting the governor to
employ investigators with authority to arrest persons eommittting acts of violence or
terror.
,1 Tex. Laws, 1947, c. 138.
42 Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312
U. S. 287 (1941) and Cafeteria Employees Union Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U. S. 293
(1943). The placard must be truly libelous, however.
48 MicH. LAws, 1939, Pub. Act No. 176, as amended by Mich. Laws, 1947. Pub. Act
No. 318, § 9c; Mo. Laws, 1947. S. B. 79, § 2 and MAss. Gr.N. LAWS, c. 214, § 9B (1932),
as amended by Mass. Laws, 1947. c. 571.
44 MASS. GEN. LAWS, c. 214. § 9B (1932), as amended by Mass. Laws, 1947, c. 571.
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able,'" while amendments to the Pennsylvania and Wisconsin
Labor Relations Acts have designated such disputes as unfair
labor practices on the part of unions. " None of these statute%
provide for any arbitration procedure. Fundamentally all these
laws seek to avoid strikes and picketing that may result from a
dispute as to which union shall be the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative of a group of employees.
Picketing of Homes
The picketing of homes or domiciles has been declared a
misdemeanor in two states" and has been made an unfair labor
practice in two others."8 Where picketing of a home is an unfair
labor practice, a person aggrieved may seek relief through the
state labor relations board.
Secondary Boycotts and Secondary Picketing
Twelve states have enacted statutes which prohibit secondary
boycott activities."9 The term "secondary boycott" has been va-
riously defined, but the California definition can be taken as
typical. A secondary boycott is:
"... any... agreement to cease performing, or to cause any em-
ployee to cease performing... services for any employer, or to cause
any loss or injury to such employer, or his employees, for the purpose of
inducing or compelling such employer to refrain from doing business
with, or handling the products of any other employer because of a
dispute between the latter and his employees or a labor organization
or any ... agreement [which causes an employer to engage in any of
the above activities.]" 50
45Calif. Laws, 1947, c. 1388.
46 PA. Pun. L.ws, Act No. 294, P. L. 1168, § 6 (d) (1937), as amended by Pa. Laws,
1947, P. L. 558 and WIs. STATS., c. 111, sub. c. 1 (1939), as amended by Wis. Laws, 1947,
c. 350, § 111.06 (j) (1).
47 Michigan and Connecticut.
45 Delaware and Utah.
49 California, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa. Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas and Utah. The Georgia statute is phrased somewhat differ-
ently from the other statutes in that it declares that it shall be unlawful to use force or
violence to prevent an employer from conducting a lawful business, or to prevent a car-
rier from delivering supplies to any such employer.
50 As originally enacted the provisions of the California "Hot Cargo" and "Secondary
Boycott" law were to be effective until May 1, 1943, and thereafter during the contin-
19481
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Where a union declares certain goods to be "unfair" or "hot cargo"
and refuses to handle them, a secondary boycott occurs."
The relief available to one injured by a secondary boycott
varies. Only injunctive relief is provided for in Delaware and
Iowa. '2 In California, Oregon, Texas and North Dakota the in-
jured party is entitled to both injunction and damages."' Maintain-
ing a secondary boycott is a misdemeanor in Georgia, Idaho,
Iowa, Missouri and Texas, while in Delaware, Pennsylvania and
Utah it is an unfair labor practice. North Dakota is the only state
terming such activity a restraint of trade.
The aim of the acts prohibiting the secondary boycott is to
prevent economic coercion of a third person, not a party to the
original labor dispute, to withhold his business patronage from
an employer with whom the union is in controversy. This objec-
tive is probably desirable, since there should be a limit beyond
which unions may not go in bringing third persons into their dis-
putes. But the statutes must be carefully drawn and construed to
avoid violation of the right of free speech guaranteed by the
Constitution.
The fate of the California statute may be taken as illustrative
of the constitutional hazards that must be run. Superior court
decisions held the statute a valid exercise of state police power
but invalid to the extent that it was broad enough to authorize
injunction against peaceful picketing and certain peaceful forms
of concerted action."4 Finally, in October, 1947, the California
uance of the existence of the national emergency and during a declared war. § 1135 of
the CALIPOaRN LABOR CODE (1937), placing a limitation on the operative period of the
statute, was repealed by Calif. Laws, 1947, c. 278, which made the law permanently
operative. In view of the fact that the national emergency and the period of the war had
not been terminated prior to Sept. 19, 1947, the law has been in effect from the date of
its original enactment.
51 Both the California and Oregon statutes define hot cargo boycotts. Calif. Laws,
1947, c. 278 and Ore. Laws, 1947, c. 356.
52 Del. Laws, 1947, H. B. 212, § 9; Iowa Laws, 1947, S. B. 111.
53 Calif. Laws, 1947, c. 278; Ore. Laws, 1947, c. 356; Tex. Laws, 1947, c. 387, §§ 3 and
4; and N. D. Laws, 1947. H. B. 160, § 13.
54 Farmer Bros. v. Wholesale Delivery Drivers & Salesmen Union Local 595, 11 C. C.
H. LAB. CAS. 1 63,352 (1946); accord, Ensher, Alexander and Barsoom, Inc. v. Fresh
[Vol. 2
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Supreme Court declared the entire act unconstitutional because
the provisions were ".... too sweeping, vague and uncertain and
permit the prior censorship of matters protected by the constitu-
tional guarantee of free speech and press. '" '
The twelve state enactments passed in 1947 prohibiting sec-
ondary boycott are very similar to the California statute. In fact,
the Texas statute defines "secondary boycott" in even broader
terms, as follows:
"... any combination... by two or more persons to cause injury to
any person for whom they are not employees, by
(1) withholding patronage, labor or other beneficial intercourse
from such persons...; or
(2) picketing such person...; or
(3) refusing to handle, ... or work on the equipment... of such
person...; or
(4) instigating.., a strike against such person...; or
(5) interfering with the free flow of commerce; or
(6) by any means causing.., any employer with whom they have
a labor dispute to inflct any damage... to an employer who is not a
party to such dispute.""8
Despite the California decision the new statutes prohibiting
secondary boycott may yet withstand constitutional challenge. It
is to be noted that section 8 (b) (4) of the Taft-Hartley Act
makes the secondary boycott an unfair labor practice"1 and that
the section has been held constitutional in LeBaron v. Printing
Specialties and Paper Converters Union. The court declared that
Fruit & Vegetable Workers Union, Local 78 et al., 3 C. C. H. La. LAw SErv. 1 64,051
(1947) ; Northwestern Pac. R. R. v. Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union, 11 C. C. H. LA&
CAS. 1 63,347 (1946) ; and Union Ice Co. v. Sales Driver's Union, 11 C. C H. LAn. C.As.
9 63,156 (1946).
55 Ex Parte Blaney, 184 P. (2d) 892 (Calif. 1947). In this case the court further stated:
"The statute makes enjoinable the mere combination or agreement to handle goods for
their employer because of a dispute between some other employer and his employees or
a labor organization." Thus the court laid great stress on the statutes condemnation of
a mere agreement to publicize a labor dispute.
56 Tex. Laws, 1947, c. 387, § 2 e.
• 7 The Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, § 8 (b) (4) forbids a union to engage
in, or to induce the employees of any employer to engage in a strike or refusal to use or
otherwise handle goods or materials, where an object there is forcing any employer to
cease selling or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer or manufact,,_rer,
or to cease doing business with any other person.
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the section did not violate the First, Fifth or Thirteenth Amend-
ments and that "only coercive and compulsive conduct was pro-
scribed."'
Texas and Utah alone have enacted statutes which prohibit
secondary picketing." This activity is a form of secondary boy.
cott. It occurs where no labor dispute exists between the person
picketed and the picketing union and the purpose is to compel
the former to cease dealing with a person with whom the union
has a labor dispute. The Texas statute declares secondary picket-
ing to be a misdemeanor and subjects the violators to fine and
imprisonment. The Utah act declares secondary picketing to be
an unfair labor practice, expressly excluding any picketing which
may be an exercise of the constitutional right of free speech.
REGULATIONS OF UNIONS
Reports and Financial Statements
Three states, Delaware, North Dakota and New Hampshire, "°
enacted statutes in 1947 requiring the annual filing of informa-
tion concerning the internal affairs of labor organizations with
the Secretary of State. The filing of an annual comprehensive
financial statement is also required. Typical is the Delaware
statute which renders necessary the filing by unions of the names
of their officers, business organizations wherein the union operates,
the amount of annual dues and assessments, the amount of the
union initiation fees, the total number of members with any limi-
tations on membership, the method and date of the last election
of officers including a count of the total vote cast, the date of the
58 75 F. Supp. 678 (S. D. Cal. 1948). For a case holding a similarly worded Pennsylvania
statute valid, see Cleland Simpson Co. v. American Communications Assn.. 3 C. C. H.
LAB. LAW SaiRv. 64, 125 (1947). The court stated in that case that similar activities,
even before the 1947 statute, had been outlawed by the Supreme Court in Alliance Auto
Service, Inc. v. Cohen, et al, 341 Pa. 283, 19 A. (2d) 152 (1941) ; Carnegie-Illinois Steel
v. United Steel Workers of America. 353 Pa. 420. 45 A. (2d) 857 (1946) and Westing-
house Electric v. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, Local 601, et al, 353 Pa.
446, 46A. (2d) 16 (1946).
59 Tex. Laws, 1947, c. 387, § 2 d and Utah Laws, 1947, H. B. 36. § 49-1.16 (2) (c).
60Dd. Laws, 1947, H. B. 212, § 11-12; N. D. Laws, 1947, H. B. 160, § 2-3 and N. H.
REv. LAws, c. 212, § 21 (b) as amended by N. H. Laws, 1947, c. 194.
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last financial statement furnished the members of the union with
a description of the method employed for distribution, and a copy
of the constitution and by-laws of the union.
North Dakota further requires a signed statement to be filed
with the secretary of state by the labor union as a prerequisite
to organization."' This statement must be under oath and must
contain the names and addresses of the officers of the union, a
general statement of the aims of the union, the scale of dues,
initiation fees, assessments to be charged to the members, the
salaries paid the officers, and the full and actual name of the
union.
Union Suability
Five states ' have enacted laws which permit a union to sue or
be sued as an entity or in its organizational name. In these states
.a money judgment accrues to the benefit of the union as an entity
or is enforceable against the union's property depending upon
whether it is plaintiff or defendant in the litigation.
In addition, the Minnesota statute declares that the transac-
tion of business in the state by a union is deemed an appointment
by the union of the secretary of state as its agent for accepting
service of legal process. 3 This solves the problem of serving
process where suit is instituted against a union.
Recent statutes in Delaware, Missouri, North Dakota and South
Dakota"' have sought to reinforce the binding obligation of col-
lective bargaining agreements between employers and labor or-
ganizations by stating that they shall be enforceable against either
party. The North Dakota statute further provides that a collective
bargaining agreement shall be binding upon a successor union."
81 N. D. Laws, 1947, H. B. 160, § 2.
62 Delaware, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota and Minnesota.
63 Minn. Laws, 1947, c. 527.
84 Del. Laws, 1947, H. B. 212, § 8; Mo. Laws, 1947, S. B. 79, § 5; N. D. Laws, 1947,
H. B. 160, § 8; and S. D. Laws, 1947, S. B. 225, § 2.3.




To prevent racial or religious discrimination by employers or
labor unions, Connecticut has passed its Fair Employment Prac-
tice Law."8 This act establishes an inter-racial commission whose
duty it is to enforce the anti-discrimination law. Provision is
made for petition by a person aggrieved to the commission to
make findings of fact and appropriate orders. Review and en-
forcement by decree are had in the courts of the state.
Massachusetts has met the problem of union discrimination
by an amendment to the state labor relations act."7 The amend-
ment permits an employee to file a complaint with the State
Labor Commission, when union membership is a requisite to his
obtaining or retaining employment at a particular place, alleging
that membership is being denied him without just cause. An
employee cannot be discharged or discriminated against because
he is not in good standing with a union with whom the employer
has a bargaining agreement unless the union certifies to the
employer (1) that the employee was denied or deprived of mem-
bership because of occupational disqualification or administra-
tion of discipline and (2) that the employee has exhausted the
available remedies within the union.
MISCELLANEOUS
Delaware alone in 1947 enacted a statute 8 prohibiting unions
from conducting "hiring halls," which are placement offices estab-
lished to cause employers to employ persons recommended by
the unions. The act also prohibits unions from contributing fi-
nancial aid to any political party or candidate for public office
and forbids a communist or a person convicted of a felony from
being an official of a labor union.
Minnesota alone has enacted a statute recognizing the right of
88 Conn. Laws, 1947, Pub. Act No. 171, § 5.
87 MAss. GEN. LAws, c. 150A, § 4, §1 (6) (1938) as amended by Mass. Laws, 1947,
c. 657.
8 Del. Laws, 1947, H. B. 212, 1 21-23.
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an employer to refuse to bargain with a labor organization while
he holds a valid collective agreement with another union."'
Four states"0 have enacted laws which forbid the use of force
or intimidation to compel an employee to join or refrain from
joining a labor union. Violations of these statutes are generally
misdemeanors punishable by fine and imprisonment. Closely re-
lated is legislation enacted in Delaware, Georgia, Michigan and
Utah declaring acts of coercion or intimidation of an employee,
or his family, in the enjoyment of their legal rights criminal
offenses or unfair labor practices.7 '
CONCLUSION
If this review of 1947 legislation has proved anything, it indi-
cates a widespread opinion among legislators that restrictions
upon labor have become necessary. Rightly or wrongly, the blame
for disruption in the national economy has been placed upon labor
unions and their leaders. No doubt excessive restrictions will be
modified. But the search for a "middle road" to be taken by
labor and management will continue. Experimentation in legisla-
tion will persist so long as industrial unrest manifests itself. It
will be of interest to observe in the future years whether or not
the recent legislation will aid in approaching the goal of even-
handed treatment of labor and management and stabilization of
industrial relations.'
I. Carlisle DeHay, Jr.
69 Minn. Laws, 1947, c. 593.
70 Delaware, Georgia, South Dakota and Utah.
71 DeL Laws, 1947, H. B. 212, § 4; Ga. Laws, 1947, Act No. 141, § 4-6; Mic. LAws,
1940 Supp., § 17115-352, as amended by Mich. Laws, 1947, Pub. Act No. 297; and Utah
Laws, 1947, H. B. 36, § 49-1-16.
T- References may be had to Commerce Clearing House Labor Law Service for the
citations to state statutes that are not included in this study.
